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Abstract Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) is a zoonotic virus from
camels causing significant mortality and morbidity in humans in the Arabian Peninsula. The
epidemiology of the virus remains poorly understood, and while case-based and
seroepidemiological studies have been employed extensively throughout the epidemic, viral
sequence data have not been utilised to their full potential. Here, we use existing MERS-CoV
sequence data to explore its phylodynamics in two of its known major hosts, humans and camels.
We employ structured coalescent models to show that long-term MERS-CoV evolution occurs
exclusively in camels, whereas humans act as a transient, and ultimately terminal host. By analysing
the distribution of human outbreak cluster sizes and zoonotic introduction times, we show that
human outbreaks in the Arabian peninsula are driven by seasonally varying zoonotic transfer of
viruses from camels. Without heretofore unseen evolution of host tropism, MERS-CoV is unlikely to
become endemic in humans.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.001
Introduction
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), endemic in camels in the Arabian Penin-
sula, is the causative agent of zoonotic infections and limited outbreaks in humans. The virus, first
discovered in 2012 (Zaki et al., 2012; van Boheemen et al., 2012), has caused more than 2000
infections and over 700 deaths, according to the World Health Organization (WHO) (World Health
Organization, 2017). Its epidemiology remains obscure, largely because infections are observed
among the most severely affected individuals, such as older males with comorbidities (Assiri et al.,
2013a; WHO MERS-Cov Research Group, 2013). While contact with camels is often reported,
other patients do not recall contact with any livestock, suggesting an unobserved community contri-
bution to the outbreak (WHO MERS-Cov Research Group, 2013). Previous studies on MERS-CoV
epidemiology have used serology to identify factors associated with MERS-CoV exposure in poten-
tial risk groups (Reusken et al., 2015; Reusken et al., 2013). Such data have shown high seropreva-
lence in camels (Mu¨ller et al., 2014; Corman et al., 2014; Chu et al., 2014; Reusken et al., 2013;
Reusken et al., 2014) and evidence of contact with MERS-CoV in workers with occupational expo-
sure to camels (Reusken et al., 2015; Mu¨ller et al., 2015). Separately, epidemiological modelling
approaches have been used to look at incidence reports through time, space and across hosts
(Cauchemez et al., 2016).
Although such epidemiological approaches yield important clues about exposure patterns and
potential for larger outbreaks, much inevitably remains opaque to such approaches due to difficul-
ties in linking cases into transmission clusters in the absence of detailed information. Where
sequence data are relatively cheap to produce, genomic epidemiological approaches can fill this crit-
ical gap in outbreak scenarios (Liu et al., 2013; Gire et al., 2014; Grubaugh et al., 2017). These
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data often yield a highly detailed picture of an epidemic when complete genome sequencing is per-
formed consistently and appropriate metadata collected (Dudas et al., 2017). Sequence data can
help discriminate between multiple and single source scenarios (Gire et al., 2014; Quick et al.,
2015), which are fundamental to quantifying risk (Grubaugh et al., 2017). Sequencing MERS-CoV
has been performed as part of initial attempts to link human infections with the camel reservoir
(Memish et al., 2014), nosocomial outbreak investigations (Assiri et al., 2013b) and routine surveil-
lance (Wernery et al., 2015). A large portion of MERS-CoV sequences come from outbreaks within
hospitals, where sequence data have been used to determine whether infections were isolated intro-
ductions or were part of a larger hospital-associated outbreak (Fagbo et al., 2015). Similar studies
on MERS-CoV have taken place at broader geographic scales, such as cities (Cotten et al., 2013).
It is widely accepted that recorded human MERS-CoV infections are a result of at least several
introductions of the virus into humans (Cotten et al., 2013) and that contact with camels is a major
risk factor for developing MERS, per WHO guidelines (World Health Organization, 2016). Previous
studies attempting to quantify the actual number of spillover infections have either relied on case-
based epidemiological approaches (Cauchemez et al., 2016) or employed methods agnostic to sig-
nals of population structure within sequence data (Zhang et al., 2016). Here, we use a dataset of
eLife digest Coronaviruses are one of many groups of viruses that cause the common cold,
though some members of the group can cause more serious illnesses. The SARS coronavirus, for
example, caused a widespread epidemic of pneumonia in 2003 that killed 774 people. In 2012, a
new coronavirus was detected in patients from the Arabian Peninsula with severe respiratory
symptoms known as Middle East respiratory syndrome (or MERS for short). To date the MERS
coronavirus has also killed over 700 people (albeit over a number of years rather than months). Yet
unlike the SARS coronavirus that spreads efficiently between humans, cases of MERS were rarely
linked to each other or to contact with animals, with the exception of hospital outbreaks.
Though camels were later identified as the original source of MERS coronavirus infections in
humans, the role of these animals in the epidemic was not well understood. Throughout the
epidemic nearly 300 genomes of the MERS coronavirus had been sequenced, from both camels and
humans. Previous attempts to understand the MERS epidemic had either relied on these data or
reports of case numbers but led to conflicting results, at odds with other sources of evidence.
Dudas et al. wanted to work out how many times the MERS coronavirus had been introduced into
humans from camels. If it happened once, this would indicate that the virus is good at spreading
between humans and that treating human cases should be a priority. However, if every human case
occurred as a new introduction of the MERS coronavirus from camels, this would mean that the
human epidemic would not stop until the virus is controlled at the source, that is, in camels. Many
scientists had argued that the second of these scenarios was most likely, but this had not been
strongly demonstrated with data.
By looking at the already sequenced genomes, Dudas et al. worked out how the MERS
coronaviruses were related to each other, and reconstructed their family tree. Information about the
host from which each sequence was collected was then mapped on the tree. Unlike previous
attempts to complete this kind of analysis, Dudas et al. took an approach that could deal with the
viruses in camels being more diverse than those in humans.
Consistent with the scenario where human cases occurred as new introductions from camels, the
analysis showed that the MERS coronavirus populations is maintained exclusively in camels and the
viruses seen in humans are evolutionary dead-ends. This suggests that MERS coronavirus spreads
poorly between humans, and has instead jumped from camels to humans hundreds of times since
2012.
As well as providing data to confirm a previously suspected hypothesis, these findings provide
more support to the current plans to mitigate infections with MERS coronavirus in the Arabian
Peninsula by focusing control efforts on camels.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.002
Dudas et al. eLife 2018;7:e31257. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257 2 of 22
Research article Epidemiology and Global Health Genomics and Evolutionary Biology
274 MERS-CoV genomes to investigate transmission patterns of the virus between humans and
camels.
Here, we use an explicit model of metapopulation structure and migration between discrete sub-
populations, referred to here as demes (Vaughan et al., 2014), derived from the structured coales-
cent (Notohara, 1990). Unlike approaches that model host species as a discrete phylogenetic trait
of the virus using continuous-time Markov processes (or simpler, parsimony based, approaches)
(Faria et al., 2013; Lycett et al., 2016), population structure models explicitly incorporate contrasts
in deme effective population sizes and migration between demes. By estimating independent coa-
lescence rates for MERS-CoV in humans and camels, as well as migration patterns between the two
demes, we show that long-term viral evolution of MERS-CoV occurs exclusively in camels. Our results
suggest that spillover events into humans are seasonal and might be associated with the calving sea-
son in camels. However, we find that MERS-CoV, once introduced into humans, follows transient
transmission chains that soon abate. Using Monte Carlo simulations we show that R0 for MERS-CoV
circulating in humans is much lower than the epidemic threshold of 1.0 and that correspondingly the
virus has been introduced into humans hundreds of times.
Results
MERS-CoV is predominantly a camel virus
The structured coalescent approach we employ (see Materials and methods) identifies camels as a
reservoir host where most of MERS-CoV evolution takes place (Figure 1), while human MERS out-
breaks are transient and terminal with respect to long-term evolution of the virus (Figure 1—figure
supplement 1). Across 174 MERS-CoV genomes collected from humans, we estimate a median of
56 separate camel-to-human cross-species transmissions (95% highest posterior density (HPD): 48–
63). While we estimate a median of 3 (95% HPD: 0–12) human-to-camel migrations, the 95% HPD
interval includes zero and we find that no such migrations are found in the maximum clade credibility
tree (Figure 1). Correspondingly, we observe substantially higher camel-to-human migration rate
estimates than human-to-camel migration rate estimates (Figure 1—figure supplement 2). This
inference derives from the tree structure wherein human viruses appear as clusters of highly related
sequences nested within the diversity seen in camel viruses, which themselves show significantly
higher diversity and less clustering. This manifests as different rates of coalescence with camel
viruses showing a scaled effective population size Net of 3.49 years (95% HPD: 2.71–4.38) and human
viruses showing a scaled effective population of 0.24 years (95% HPD: 0.14–0.34).
We believe that the small number of inferred human-to-camel migrations are induced by the
migration rate prior, while some are derived from phylogenetic proximity of human sequences to
the apparent ‘backbone’ of the phylogenetic tree. This is most apparent in lineages in early-mid
2013 that lead up to sequences comprising the MERS-CoV clade dominant in 2015, where owing to
poor sampling of MERS-CoV genetic diversity from camels the model cannot completely dismiss
humans as a potential alternative host. The first sequences of MERS-CoV from camels do not appear
in our data until November 2013. Our finding of negligible human-to-camel transmission is robust to
choice of prior (Figure 1—figure supplement 2).
The repeated and asymmetric introductions of short-lived clusters of MERS-CoV sequences from
camels into humans leads us to conclude that MERS-CoV epidemiology in humans is dominated by
zoonotic transmission (Figure 1 and Figure 1—figure supplement 1). We observe dense terminal
clusters of MERS-CoV circulating in humans that are of no subsequent relevance to the evolution of
the virus. These clusters of presumed human-to-human transmission are then embedded within
extensive diversity of MERS-CoV lineages inferred to be circulating in camels, a classic pattern of
source-sink dynamics. Our findings suggest that instances of human infection with MERS-CoV are
more common than currently thought, with exceedingly short transmission chains mostly limited to
primary cases that might be mild and ultimately not detected by surveillance or sequencing. Struc-
tured coalescent analyses recover the camel-centered picture of MERS-CoV evolution despite
sequence data heavily skewed towards non-uniformly sampled human cases and are robust to choice
of prior. Comparing these results with a currently standard discrete trait analysis (Lemey et al.,
2009) approach for ancestral state reconstruction shows dramatic differences in host reconstruction
at internal nodes (Figure 1—figure supplement 3). Discrete trait analysis reconstruction identifies
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Figure 1. Typed maximum clade credibility tree of MERS-CoV genomes from 174 human viruses and 100 camel viruses. Maximum clade credibility
(MCC) tree showing inferred ancestral hosts for MERS-CoV recovered with the structured coalescent. The vast majority of MERS-CoV evolution is
inferred to occur in camels (orange) with human outbreaks (blue) representing evolutionary dead-ends for the virus. Confidence in host assignment is
depicted as a colour gradient, with increased uncertainty in host assignment (posterior probabilities close to 0.5) shown as grey. While large clusters of
human cases are apparent in the tree, significant contributions to human outbreaks are made by singleton sequences, likely representing recent cross-
species transmissions that were caught early.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.003
The following source data and figure supplements are available for figure 1:
Source data 1. XML to run structured coalescent analysis and output files.
Figure 1 continued on next page
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both camels and humans as important hosts for MERS-CoV persistence, but with humans as the ulti-
mate source of camel infections. A similar approach has been attempted previously (Zhang et al.,
2016), but this interpretation of MERS-CoV evolution disagrees with lack of continuing human trans-
mission chains outside of Arabian peninsula, low seroprevalence in humans and very high seropreva-
lence in camels across Saudi Arabia. We suspect that this particular discrete trait analysis
reconstruction is false due to biased data, that is, having nearly twice as many MERS-CoV sequences
from humans (n ¼ 174) than from camels (n ¼ 100) and the inability of the model to account for and
quantify vastly different rates of coalescence in the phylogenetic vicinity of both types of sequences.
We can replicate these results by either applying the same model to current data (Figure 1—figure
supplement 3) or by enforcing equal coalescence rates within each deme in the structured coales-
cent model (Figure 1—figure supplement 4).
MERS-CoV shows seasonal introductions
We use the posterior distribution of MERS-CoV introduction events from camels to humans (Fig-
ure 1) to model seasonal variation in zoonotic transfer of viruses. We identify four months (April,
May, June, July) when the odds of MERS-CoV introductions are increased (Figure 2) and four when
the odds are decreased (August, September, November, December). Camel calving is reported to
occur from October to February (Almutairi et al., 2010), with rapidly declining maternal antibody
levels in calves within the first weeks after birth (Wernery, 2001). It is possible that MERS-CoV
sweeps through each new camel generation once critical mass of susceptibles is reached (Martinez-
Bakker et al., 2014), leading to a sharp rise in prevalence of the virus in camels and resulting in
increased force of infection into the human population. Strong influx of susceptibles and subsequent
sweeping outbreaks in camels may explain evidence of widespread exposure to MERS-CoV in cam-
els from seroepidemiology (Mu¨ller et al., 2014; Corman et al., 2014; Chu et al., 2014;
Reusken et al., 2013; Reusken et al., 2014).
Although we find evidence of seasonality in zoonotic spillover timing, no such relationship exists
for sizes of human sequence clusters (Figure 2B). This is entirely expected, since little seasonality in
human behaviour that could facilitate MERS-CoV transmission is expected following an introduction.
Similarly, we do not observe any trend in human sequence cluster sizes over time (Figure 2B, Spear-
man  ¼ 0:06, p ¼ 0:68), suggesting that MERS-CoV outbreaks in humans are neither growing nor
shrinking in size. This is not surprising either, since MERS-CoV is a camel virus that has to date, expe-
rienced little-to-no selective pressure to improve transmissibility between humans.
Figure 1 continued
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.009
Source data 2. XML to run structured coalescent analysis with a relaxed prior and output file.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.010
Source data 3. XML to run discrete trait analysis (DTA) and output files.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.011
Source data 4. XML to run structured coalescent analysis with equal deme sizes between humans and camels and output files.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.012
Source data 5. Maximum likelihood phylogeny.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.013
Figure supplement 1. Evolutionary history of MERS-CoV partitioned between camels and humans.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.004
Figure supplement 2. Posterior backwards migration rate estimates for two choices of prior.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.005
Figure supplement 3. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree with ancestral state reconstruction according to a discrete trait model.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.006
Figure supplement 4. Maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree of structured coalescent model with enforced equal coalescence rates.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.007
Figure supplement 5. Maximum likelihood (ML) tree of MERS-CoV genomes coloured by origin of sequence.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.008
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MERS-CoV is poorly suited for human transmission
Structured coalescent approaches clearly show humans to be a terminal host for MERS-CoV, imply-
ing poor transmissibility. However, we wanted to translate this observation into an estimate of the
basic reproductive number R0 to provide an intuitive epidemic behaviour metric that does not
require expertise in reading phylogenies. The parameter R0 determines expected number of second-
ary cases in a single infections as well as the distribution of total cases that result from a single intro-
duction event into the human population (Equation 1, Materials and methods). We estimate R0
along with other relevant parameters via Monte Carlo simulation in two steps. First, we simulate
Figure 2. Seasonality of MERS-CoV introduction events. (A) Posterior density estimates partitioned by month showing the 95% highest posterior
density interval for relative odds ratios of MERS-CoV introductions into humans. Posterior means are indicated with circles. Evidence for increased or
decreased risk (95% HPD excludes 1.0) for introductions are indicated by black or white circles, respectively. Hatched area spanning October to
February indicates the camel calving season. (B) Sequence cluster sizes and inferred dates of introduction events. Each introduction event is shown as a
vertical line positioned based on the median introduction time, as recovered by structured coalescent analyses and coloured by time of year with
height indicating number of descendant sequences recovered from human cases. 95% highest posterior density intervals for introductions of MERS-
CoV into humans are indicated with coloured lines, coloured by median estimated introduction time. The black dotted line indicates the joint
probability density for introductions. We find little correlation between date and size of introduction (Spearman  ¼ 0:06, p ¼ 0:68).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.014
The following source data is available for figure 2:
Source data 1. MCMC samples from seasonality inference analysis.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.015
Dudas et al. eLife 2018;7:e31257. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257 6 of 22
Research article Epidemiology and Global Health Genomics and Evolutionary Biology
case counts across multiple outbreaks totaling 2000 cases using Equation 1 and then we subsample
from each case cluster to simulate sequencing of a fraction of cases. Sequencing simulations are per-
formed via a multivariate hypergeometric distribution, where the probability of sequencing from a
particular cluster depends on available sequencing capacity (number of trials), numbers of cases in
the cluster (number of successes) and number of cases outside the cluster (number of failures). In
addition, each hypergeometric distribution used to simulate sequencing is concentrated via a bias
parameter, that enriches for large sequence clusters at the expense of smaller ones (for its effects
see Figure 3—figure supplement 1). This is a particularly pressing issue, since a priori we expect
large hospital outbreaks of MERS to be overrepresented in sequence data, whereas sequences from
primary cases will be sampled exceedingly rarely. We record the number, mean, standard deviation
and skewness (third standardised moment) of sequence cluster sizes in each simulation (left-hand
panel in Figure 3) and extract the subset of Monte Carlo simulations in which these summary statis-
tics fall within the 95% highest posterior density observed in the empirical MERS-CoV data from
structured coalescent analyses. We record R0 values, as well as the number of case clusters (equiva-
lent to number of zoonotic introductions), for these empirically matched simulations. A schematic of
this Monte Carlo procedure is shown in Figure 3—figure supplement 2. Since the total number of
Figure 3. Monte Carlo simulations of human transmission clusters. Leftmost scatter plot shows the distribution of individual Monte Carlo simulation
sequence cluster size statistics (mean and skewness) coloured by the R0 value used for the simulation. The dotted rectangle identifies the 95% highest
posterior density bounds for sequence cluster size mean and skewness observed for empirical MERS-CoV data. The distribution of R0 values that fall
within 95% HPDs for sequence cluster size mean, standard deviation, skewness and number of introductions, is shown in the middle, on the same y-
axis. Bins falling inside the 95% percentiles are coloured by R0, as in the leftmost scatter plot. The distribution of total number of introductions
associated with simulations matching MERS-CoV sequence clusters is shown on the right. Darker shade of grey indicates bins falling within the 95%
percentiles. Monte Carlo simulations indicate R0 for MERS-CoV in humans is likely to be below 1.0, with numbers of zoonotic transmissions numbering
in the hundreds.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.016
The following figure supplements are available for figure 3:
Figure supplement 1. Monte Carlo simulations of human transmission clusters.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.017
Figure supplement 2. Monte Carlo simulation schematic.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.018
Figure supplement 3. Results of Monte Carlo simulations with vast underestimation of cases.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.019
Figure supplement 4. Boxplots of matching simulated case and sequence cluster distributions.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.020
Figure supplement 5. Quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot of empirical and simulated sequence cluster sizes.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.021
Figure supplement 6. Numbers of epidemiological simulations conforming to empirical observations.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.022
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cases is fixed at 2000, higher R0 results in fewer larger transmission clusters, while lower R0 results in
many smaller transmission clusters.
We find that observed phylogenetic patterns of sequence clustering strongly support R0 below
1.0 (middle panel in Figure 3). Mean R0 value observed in matching simulations is 0.72 (95% percen-
tiles 0.57–0.90), suggesting the inability of the virus to sustain transmission in humans. Lower values
for R0 in turn suggest relatively large numbers of zoonotic transfers of viruses into humans (right-
hand panel in Figure 3). Median number of cross-species introductions observed in matching simula-
tions is 592 (95% percentiles 311–811). Our results suggest a large number of unobserved MERS pri-
mary cases. Given this, we also performed simulations where the total number of cases is doubled to
4000 to explore the impact of dramatic underestimation of MERS cases. In these analyses, R0 values
tend to decrease even further as numbers of introductions go up, although very few simulations
match currently observed MERS-CoV sequence data (Figure 3—figure supplement 3).
Overall, our analyses indicate that MERS-CoV is poorly suited for human-to-human transmission,
with an estimated R0<0:90 and sequence sampling likely to be biased towards large hospital out-
breaks (Figure 3—figure supplement 1). All matching simulations exhibit highly skewed distribu-
tions of case cluster sizes with long tails (Figure 3—figure supplement 4), which is qualitatively
similar to the results of (Cauchemez et al., 2016). We find that simulated sequence cluster sizes
resemble observed sequence cluster sizes in the posterior distribution, with a slight reduction in
mid-sized clusters in simulated data (Figure 3—figure supplement 5). Given these findings, and the
fact that large outbreaks of MERS occurred in hospitals, the combination of frequent spillover of
MERS-CoV into humans and occasional outbreak amplification via poor hygiene practices
(Assiri et al., 2013b; Chen et al., 2017) appear sufficient to explain observed epidemiological pat-
terns of MERS-CoV.
Recombination shapes MERS-CoV diversity
Recombination has been shown to occur in all genera of coronaviruses, including MERS-CoV
(Lai et al., 1985; Makino et al., 1986; Keck et al., 1988; Kottier et al., 1995; Herrewegh et al.,
1998). In order to quantify the degree to recombination has shaped MERS-CoV genetic diversity,
we used two recombination detection approaches across partitions of taxa corresponding to
inferred MERS-CoV clades. Both methods rely on sampling parental and recombinant alleles within
the alignment, although each quantifies different signals of recombination. One hallmark of recombi-
nation is the ability to carry alleles derived via mutation from one lineage to another, which appear
as repeated mutations taking place in the recipient lineage, somewhere else in the tree. The PHI
(pairwise homoplasy index) test quantifies the appearance of these excessive repeat mutations
(homoplasies) within an alignment (Bruen et al., 2006). Another hallmark of recombination is cluster-
ing of alleles along the genome, due to how template switching, the primary mechanism of recombi-
nation in RNA viruses, occurs. 3Seq relies on the clustering of nucleotide similarities along the
genome between sequence triplets – two potential parent-donors and one candidate offspring-
recipient sequences (Boni et al., 2007).
Both tests can give spurious results in cases of extreme rate heterogeneity and sampling over
time (Dudas and Rambaut, 2016), but both tests have not been reported to fail simultaneously. PHI
and 3Seq methods consistently identify most of the apparent ‘backbone’ of the MERS-CoV phylog-
eny as encompassing sequences with evidence of recombination (Figure 4—figure supplement 1).
Neither method can identify where in the tree recombination occurred, but each full asterisk in Fig-
ure 4—figure supplement 1 should be interpreted as the minimum partition of data that still cap-
tures both donor and recipient alleles involved in a recombination event. This suggests a non-
negligible contribution of recombination in shaping existing MERS-CoV diversity. As done previously
(Dudas and Rambaut, 2016), we show large numbers of homoplasies in MERS-CoV data (Figure 4—
figure supplement 2) with some evidence of genomic clustering of such alleles. These results are
consistent with high incidence of MERS-CoV in camels (Mu¨ller et al., 2014; Corman et al., 2014;
Chu et al., 2014; Reusken et al., 2014; Ali et al., 2017), allowing for co-infection with distinct geno-
types and thus recombination to occur.
Owing to these findings, we performed a sensitivity analysis in which we partitioned the MERS-
CoV genome into two fragments and identified human outbreak clusters within each fragment. We
find strong similarity in the grouping of human cases into outbreak clusters between fragments
(Figure 4A). Between the two trees in Figure 4B four (out of 54) ‘human’ clades are expanded
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where either singleton introductions or two-taxon clades in fragment 2 join other clades in fragment
1. For the reverse comparison, there are five ‘human’ clades (out of 53) in fragment 2 that are
expanded. All such clades have low divergence (Figure 4B) and thus incongruences in human clades
are more likely to be caused by differences in deme assignment rather than actual recombination.
And while we observe evidence of distinct phylogenetic trees from different parts of the MERS-CoV
genome (Figure 4B), human clades are minimally affected and large portions of the posterior proba-
bility density in both parts of the genome are concentrated in shared clades (Figure 4—figure sup-
plement 3). Additionally, we observe the same source-sink dynamics between camel and human
populations in trees constructed from separate genomic fragments as were observed in the original
full genome tree (Figures 1 and 4B).
Observed departures from strictly clonal evolution suggest that while recombination is an issue
for inferring MERS-CoV phylogenies, its effect on the human side of MERS outbreaks is minimal, as
expected if humans represent a transient host with little opportunity for co-infection. MERS-CoV
evolution on the reservoir side is complicated by recombination, although is nonetheless still largely
Figure 4. Recombinant features of MERS-CoV phylogenies. (A) Marginal posterior probabilities of taxa collected from humans belonging to the same
clade in phylogenies derived from different parts of the genome. Taxa are ordered according to phylogeny of fragment 2 (genome positions 21001 to
29364) reduced to just the human tips and is displayed on the left. Human clusters are largely well-supported as monophyletic and consistent across
trees of both genomic fragments. (B) Tanglegram connecting the same taxa between a phylogeny derived from fragment 1 (left, genome positions 1 to
21000) and fragment 2 (right, genome positions 21001 to 29364), reduced to just the human tips and branches with posterior probability <0:1 collapsed.
Human clusters exhibit limited diversity and corresponding low levels of incongruence within an introduction cluster.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.023
The following source data and figure supplements are available for figure 4:
Source data 1. XML to run structured coalescent analysis on bisected alignment with output files.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.027
Source data 2. Output from PHI and 3Seq recombination analyses.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.028
Source data 3. Output from ClonalFrameML analysis.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.029
Figure supplement 1. Tests of recombination across MERS-CoV clades.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.024
Figure supplement 2. MERS-CoV genomes exhibit high numbers of non-clonal loci.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.025
Figure supplement 3. Human clade sharing between genomic fragments 1 and 2.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.026
Dudas et al. eLife 2018;7:e31257. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257 9 of 22
Research article Epidemiology and Global Health Genomics and Evolutionary Biology
amenable to phylogenetic methods. Amongst other parameters of interest, recombination is
expected to interfere with molecular clocks, where transferred genomic regions can give the impres-
sion of branches undergoing rapid evolution, or branches where recombination results in reversions
appearing to evolve slow. In addition to its potential to influence tree topology, recombination in
molecular sequence data is an erratic force with unpredictable effects. We suspect that the effects
of recombination in MERS-CoV data are reigned in by a relatively small effective population size of
the virus in Saudi Arabia (see next section) where haplotypes are fixed or nearly fixed, thus prevent-
ing an accumulation of genetic diversity that would then be reshuffled via recombination. Neverthe-
less the evolutionary rate of the virus appears to fall firmly within the expected range for RNA
viruses: regression of nucleotide differences to Jordan-N3/2012 genome against sequence collection
dates yields a rate of 4:59 10 4 subs/site/year, Bayesian structured coalescent estimate from pri-
mary analysis 9:57 10 4 (95% HPDs: 8:28  10:9 10 4) subs/site/year.
MERS-CoV shows population turnover in camels
Here, we attempt to investigate MERS-CoV demographic patterns in the camel reservoir. We sup-
plement camel sequence data with a single earliest sequence from each human cluster, treating viral
diversity present in humans as a sentinel sample of MERS-CoV diversity circulating in camels. This
removes conflicting demographic signals sampled during human outbreaks, where densely sampled
closely related sequences from humans could be misconstrued as evidence of demographic crash in
the viral population.
Despite lack of convergence, neither of the two demographic reconstructions show evidence of
fluctuations in the scaled effective population size (Net) of MERS-CoV over time (Figure 5). We
recover a similar demographic trajectory when estimating Net over time with a skygrid tree prior
across the genome split into ten fragments with independent phylogenetic trees to account for con-
founding effects of recombination (Figure 5—figure supplement 1). However, we do note that coa-
lescence rate estimates are high relative to the sampling time period, with a mean estimate of Net at
3.49 years (95% HPD: 2.71–4.38), and consequently MERS-CoV phylogeny resembles a ladder, as
often seen in human influenza A virus phylogenies (Bedford et al., 2011).
This empirically estimated effectived population can be compared to the expected effective pop-
ulation size in a simple epidemiological model. At endemic equilibrium, we expect scaled effective
population size Net to follow I = 2b, where b is the equilibrium rate of transmission and I is the equi-
librium number of infecteds (Frost and Volz, 2010). We assume that b is constant and is equal to
the rate of recovery. Given a 20 day duration of infection in camels (Adney et al., 2014), we arrive
at b ¼ 365=20 ¼ 18:25 infections per year. Given extremely high seroprevalence estimates within
camels in Saudi Arabia (Mu¨ller et al., 2014; Corman et al., 2014; Chu et al., 2014; Reusken et al.,
2013; Reusken et al., 2014), we expect camels to usually be infected within their first year of life.
Therefore, we can estimate the rough number of camel infections per year as the number of calves
produced each year. We find there are 830,000 camels in Saudi Arabia (Abdallah and Faye, 2013)
and that female camels in Saudi Arabia have an average fecundity of 45% (Abdallah and Faye,
2013). Thus, we expect 830 000 0:50 0:45 ¼ 186 750 new calves produced yearly and correspond-
ingly 186,750 new infections every year, which spread over 20 day intervals gives an average preva-
lence of I ¼ 10 233 infections. This results in an expected scaled effective population size Net ¼ 280:4
years.
Comparing expected Net to empirical Net we arrive at a ratio of 80.3 (64.0–103.5). This is less
than the equivalent ratio for human measles virus (Bedford et al., 2011) and is in line with the
expectation from neutral evolutionary dynamics plus some degree of transmission heterogeneity
(Volz et al., 2013) and seasonal troughs in prevalence. Thus, we believe that the ladder-like appear-
ance of the MERS-CoV tree can likely be explained by entirely demographic factors.
Discussion
MERS-CoV epidemiology
In this study we aimed to understand the drivers of MERS coronavirus transmission in humans and
what role the camel reservoir plays in perpetuating the epidemic in the Arabian peninsula by using
sequence data collected from both hosts (174 from humans and 100 from camels). We showed that
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currently existing models of population structure (Vaughan et al., 2014) can identify distinct demo-
graphic modes in MERS-CoV genomic data, where viruses continuously circulating in camels repeat-
edly jump into humans and cause small outbreaks doomed to extinction (Figure 1—figure
supplement 1). This inference succeeds under different choices of priors for unknown demographic
parameters (Figure 1—figure supplement 2) and in the presence of strong biases in sequence sam-
pling schemes (Figure 3). When rapid coalescence in the human deme is not allowed (Figure 1—fig-
ure supplement 4) structured coalescent inference loses power and ancestral state reconstruction is
nearly identical to that of discrete trait analysis (Figure 1—figure supplement 3). When allowed dif-
ferent deme-specific population sizes, the structured coalescent model succeeds because a large
proportion of human sequences fall into tightly connected clusters, which informs a low estimate for
the population size of the human deme. This in turn informs the inferred state of long ancestral
branches in the phylogeny, that is, because these long branches are not immediately coalescing,
they are most likely in camels.
Figure 5. Demographic history of MERS-CoV in Arabian peninsula camels. Demographic history of MERS-CoV in camels, as inferred via a skygrid
coalescent tree prior (Gill et al., 2013). Three skygrid reconstructions are shown, red and orange for each of the stationary distributions reached by
MCMC with the whole genome and a black one where the genome was split into ten partitions. Shaded interval indicates the 95% highest posterior
density interval for the product of generation time and effective population size, Net. Midline tracks the inferred median of Net.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.030
The following source data and figure supplement are available for figure 5:
Source data 1. XML to run skygrid analysis on camel-like sequence data and output files.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.032
Figure supplement 1. Skygrid comparison between whole and fragmented genomes.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31257.031
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From sequence data, we identify at least 50 zoonotic introductions of MERS-CoV into humans
from the reservoir (Figure 1), from which we extrapolate that hundreds more such introductions
must have taken place (Figure 3). Although we recover migration rates from our model (Figure 1—
figure supplement 2), these only pertain to sequences and in no way reflect the epidemiologically
relevant per capita rates of zoonotic spillover events. We also looked at potential seasonality in
MERS-CoV spillover into humans. Our analyses indicated a period of three months where the odds
of a sequenced spillover event are increased, with timing consistent with an enzootic amongst camel
calves (Figure 2). As a result of our identification of large and asymmetric flow of viral lineages into
humans we also find that the basic reproduction number for MERS-CoV in humans is well below the
epidemic threshold (Figure 3). Having said that, there are highly customisable coalescent methods
available that extend the methods used here to accommodate time varying migration rates and pop-
ulation sizes, integrate alternative sources of information and fit to stochastic nonlinear models
(Rasmussen et al., 2014), which would be more appropriate for MERS-CoV. Some distinct aspects
of MERS-CoV epidemiology could not be captured in our methodology, such as hospital outbreaks
where R0 is expected to be consistently closer to 1.0 compared to community transmission of MERS-
CoV. Outside of coalescent-based models, there are population structure models that explicitly
relate epidemiological parameters to the branching process observed in sequence data
(Ku¨hnert et al., 2016), but often rely on specifying numerous informative priors and can suffer from
MCMC convergence issues.
Strong population structure in viruses often arises through limited gene flow, either due to geog-
raphy (Dudas et al., 2017), ecology (Smith et al., 2009) or evolutionary forces (Turner et al., 2005;
Dudas et al., 2015). On a smaller scale, population structure can unveil important details about
transmission patterns, such as identifying reservoirs and understanding spillover trends and risk,
much as we have done here. When properly understood naturally arising barriers to gene flow can
be exploited for more efficient disease control and prevention, as well as risk management.
Transmissibility differences between zoonoses and pandemics
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus, a Betacoronavirus like MERS-CoV, caused a
serious epidemic in humans in 2003, with over 8000 cases and nearly 800 deaths. Since MERS-CoV
was also able to cause significant pathogenicity in the human host it was inevitable that parallels
would be drawn between MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV at the time of MERS discovery in 2012.
Although we describe the epidemiology of MERS-CoV from sequence data, indications that MERS-
CoV has poor capacity to spread human-to-human existed prior to any sequence data. SARS-CoV
swept through the world in a short period of time, but MERS cases trickled slowly and were
restricted to the Arabian Peninsula or resulted in self-limiting outbreaks outside of the region, a pat-
tern strongly indicative of repeat zoonotic spillover. Infectious disease surveillance and control meas-
ures remain limited, so much like the SARS epidemic in 2003 or the H1N1 pandemic in 2009,
zoonotic pathogens with R0>1:0 are probably going to be discovered after spreading beyond the
original location of spillover. Even though our results show that MERS-CoV does not appear to pres-
ent an imminent global threat, we would like to highlight that its epidemiology is nonetheless
concerning.
Pathogens Bacillus anthracis, Andes hantavirus (Martinez et al., 2005), monkeypox (Reed et al.,
2004) and influenza A are able to jump species barriers but only influenza A viruses have historically
resulted in pandemics (Lipsitch et al., 2016). MERS-CoV may join the list of pathogens able to jump
species barriers but not spread efficiently in the new host. Since its emergence in 2012, MERS-CoV
has caused self-limiting outbreaks in humans with no evidence of worsening outbreaks over time.
However, sustained evolution of the virus in the reservoir and continued flow of viral lineages into
humans provides the substrate for a more transmissible variant of MERS-CoV to possibly emerge.
Previous modelling studies (Antia et al., 2003; Park et al., 2013) suggest a positive relationship
between initial R0 in the human host and probability of evolutionary emergence of a novel strain
which passes the supercritical threshold of R0>1:0. This leaves MERS-CoV in a precarious position;
on one hand its current R0 of ~0.7 is certainly less than 1, but its proximity to the supercritical
threshold raises alarm. With very little known about the fitness landscape or adaptive potential of
MERS-CoV, it is incredibly challenging to predict the likelihood of the emergence more transmissible
variants. In light of these difficulties, we encourage continued genomic surveillance of MERS-CoV in
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the camel reservoir and from sporadic human cases to rapidly identify a supercritical variant, if one
does emerge.
Materials and methods
Sequence data
All MERS-CoV sequences were downloaded from GenBank and accession numbers are given in
Supplementary file 1. Sequences without accessions were kindly shared by Ali M. Somily, Mazin
Barry, Sarah S. Al Subaie, Abdulaziz A. BinSaeed, Fahad A. Alzamil, Waleed Zaher, Theeb Al Qah-
tani, Khaldoon Al Jerian, Scott J.N. McNabb, Imad A. Al-Jahdali, Ahmed M. Alotaibi, Nahid A.
Batarfi, Matthew Cotten, Simon J. Watson, Spela Binter, and Paul Kellam prior to publication. Frag-
ments of some strains submitted to GenBank as separate accessions were assembled into a single
sequence. Only sequences covering at least 50% of MERS-CoV genome were kept, to facilitate later
analyses where the alignment is split into two parts in order to account for effects of recombination
(Dudas and Rambaut, 2016). Sequences were annotated with available collection dates and hosts,
designated as camel or human, aligned with MAFFT (Katoh and Standley, 2013), and edited manu-
ally. Protein coding sequences were extracted and concatenated, reducing alignment length from
30,130 down to 29,364, which allowed for codon-partitioned substitution models to be used. The
final dataset consisted of 174 genomes from human infections and 100 genomes from camel infec-
tions (Supplementary file 1).
Phylogenetic analyses
Primary analysis, structured coalescent
For our primary analysis, the MultiTypeTree module (Vaughan et al., 2014) of BEAST v2.4.3
(Bouckaert et al., 2014) was used to specify a structured coalescent model with two demes –
humans and camels. At time of writing structured population models are available in BEAST v2
(Bouckaert et al., 2014) but not in BEAST v1 (Drummond et al., 2012). We use the more computa-
tionally intensive MultiTypeTree module (Vaughan et al., 2014) over approximate methods also
available in BEAST v2, such as BASTA (De Maio et al., 2015), MASCOT (Mueller et al., 2017), and
PhyDyn (Volz, 2012). Structured coalescent model implemented in the MultiTypeTree module
(Vaughan et al., 2014) estimates four parameters: rate of coalescence in human viruses, rate of coa-
lescence in camel viruses, rate of migration from the human deme to the camel deme and rate of
migration from the camel deme to the human deme. Analyses were run on codon position parti-
tioned data with two separate HKY+G4(Hasegawa et al., 1985; Yang, 1994) nucleotide substitution
models specified for codon positions 1 + 2 and 3. A relaxed molecular clock with branch rates drawn
from a lognormal distribution (Drummond et al., 2006) was used to infer the evolutionary rate from
date calibrated tips. Default priors were used for all parameters except for migration rates between
demes for which an exponential prior with mean 1.0 was used. All analyses were run for 200 million
steps across ten independent Markov chains (MCMC runs) and states were sampled every 20,000
steps. Due to the complexity of multitype tree parameter space 50% of states from every analysis
were discarded as burn-in, convergence assessed in Tracer v1.6 and states combined using Log-
Combiner distributed with BEAST v2.4.3 (Bouckaert et al., 2014). Three chains out of ten did not
converge and were discarded altogether. This left 70,000 states on which to base posterior infer-
ence. Posterior sets of typed (where migrating branches from structured coalescent are collapsed,
and migration information is left as a switch in state between parent and descendant nodes) trees
were summarised using TreeAnnotator v2.4.3 with the common ancestor heights option (Heled and
Bouckaert, 2013). A maximum likelihood phylogeny showing just the genetic relationships between
MERS-CoV genomes from camels and humans was recovered using PhyML (Guindon et al., 2003)
under a HKY+G4(Hasegawa et al., 1985; Yang, 1994) nucleotide substitution model and is shown in
Figure 1—figure supplement 5.
Control, structured coalescent with different prior
As a secondary analysis to test robustness to choice of prior, we set up an analysis where we
increased the mean of the exponential distribution prior for migration rate to 10.0. All other parame-
ters were identical to the primary analysis and as before 10 independent MCMC chains were run. In
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this case, two chains did not converge. This left 80,000 states on which to base posterior inference.
Posterior sets of typed trees were summarised using TreeAnnotator v2.4.3 with the common ances-
tor heights option (Heled and Bouckaert, 2013).
Control, structured coalescent with equal deme sizes
To better understand where statistical power of the structured coalescent model lies we set up a ter-
tiary analysis where a model was set up identically to the first structured coalescent analysis, but
deme population sizes were enforced to have the same size. This analysis allowed us to differentiate
whether statistical power in our analysis is coming from effective population size contrasts between
demes or the backwards-in-time migration rate estimation. Five replicate chains were set up, two of
which failed to converge after 200 million states. Combining the three converging runs left us
with 15,000 trees sampled from the posterior distribution, which were summarised in TreeAnnotator
v2.4.3 with the common ancestor heights option (Heled and Bouckaert, 2013).
Control, structured coalescent with more than one tree per genome
Due to concerns that recombination might affect our conclusions (Dudas and Rambaut, 2016), as
an additional secondary analysis, we also considered a scenario where alignments were split into two
fragments (fragment 1 comprised of positions 1–21000, fragment 2 of positions 21000–29364), with
independent clocks, trees and migration rates, but shared substitution models and deme population
sizes. Fragment positions were chosen based on consistent identification of the region around nucle-
otide 21000 as a probable breakpoint by GARD (Kosakovsky Pond et al., 2006) by previous studies
into SARS and MERS coronaviruses (Hon et al., 2008; Dudas and Rambaut, 2016). All analyses
were set to run for 200 million states, subsampling every 20,000 states. Chains not converging after
200 million states were discarded. 20% of the states were discarded as burn-in, convergence
assessed with Tracer 1.6 and combined with LogCombiner. Three chains out of ten did not con-
verge. This left 70,000 states on which to base posterior inference. Posterior sets of typed trees
were summarised using TreeAnnotator v2.4.3 with the common ancestor heights option (Heled and
Bouckaert, 2013).
Control, discrete trait analysis
A currently widely used approach to infer ancestral states in phylogenies relies on treating traits of
interest (such as geography, host, etc.) as features evolving along a phylogeny as continuous time
Markov chains with an arbitrary number of states (Lemey et al., 2009). Unlike structured coalescent
methods, such discrete trait approaches are independent from the tree (i.e. demographic) prior and
thus unable to influence coalescence rates under different trait states. Such models have been used
in the past to infer the number of MERS-CoV host jumps (Zhang et al., 2016) with results contradict-
ing other sources of information. In order to test how a discrete trait approach compares to the
structured coalescent we used our 274 MERS-CoV genome data set in BEAST v2.4.3
(Bouckaert et al., 2014) and specified identical codon-partitioned nucleotide substitution and
molecular clock models to our structured coalescent analysis. To give the most comparable results,
we used a constant population size coalescent model, as this is the demographic function for each
deme in the structured coalescent model. Five replicate MCMC analyses were run for 200 million
states, three of which converged onto the same posterior distribution. The converging chains were
combined after removing 20 million states as burn-in to give a total of 27,000 trees drawn from the
posterior distribution. These trees were then summarised using TreeAnnotator v2.4.5 with the com-
mon ancestor heights option (Heled and Bouckaert, 2013).
Introduction seasonality
We extracted the times of camel-to-human introductions from the posterior distribution of multitype
trees. This distribution of introduction times was then discretised as follows: for sample k ¼
1; 2; . . . ; L from the posterior, Zijk was 1 if there as an introduction in month i and year j and 0 other-
wise. We model the sum of introductions at month i and year j across the posterior sample Yij ¼
PL
k¼1 Zijk with the hierarchical model:
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Yij ~BinomialðL; ijÞ
ij ¼ inverse logitðajþbiÞ
aj ~Normalðy;syÞ
y ~Normalð0;1Þ
sy ~Cauchyð0;2:5Þ
bi ~Normalð0;smÞ
sm ~Cauchyð0;2:5Þ;
where aj represents the contribution of year to expected introduction count and bi represents the
contribution of month to expected introduction count. Here, inverse logitðajþbiÞ ¼
expðajþbiÞ
expðajþbiÞþ1
. We
sampled posterior values from this model via the Markov chain Monte Carlo methods implemented
in Stan (Carpenter et al., 2016). Odds ratios of introductions were computed for each month i as
ORi ¼ expðbiÞ.
Epidemiological analyses
Here, we employ a Monte Carlo simulation approach to identify parameters consistent with
observed patterns of sequence clustering (Figure 3—figure supplement 2). Our structured coales-
cent analyses indicate that every MERS outbreak is a contained cross-species spillover of the virus
from camels into humans. The distribution of the number of these cross-species transmissions and
their sizes thus contain information about the underlying transmission process. At heart, we expect
fewer larger clusters if fundamental reproductive number R0 is large and more smaller clusters if R0
is small. A similar approach was used in Grubaugh et al. (2017) to estimate R0 for Zika introductions
into Florida.
Branching process theory provides an analytical distribution for the number of eventual cases j in
a transmission chain resulting from a single introduction event with R0 and dispersion parameter
! (Blumberg and Lloyd-Smith, 2013). This distribution follows
PrðjjR0;!Þ ¼
Gð!jþ j  1Þ
Gð!jÞGðjþ 1Þ
ðR0! Þ
j 1
ð1þ R0! Þ
!jþj 1
: (1)
Here, R0 represents the expected number of secondary cases following a single infection and !
represents the dispersion parameter assuming secondary cases follow a negative binomial distribu-
tion (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2005), so that smaller values represent larger degrees of heterogeneity in
the transmission process.
As of 10 May 2017, the World Health Organization has been notified of 1952 cases of MERS-CoV
(World Health Organization, 2017). We thus simulated final transmission chain sizes using Equa-
tion 1 until we reached an epidemic comprised of N ¼ 2000 cases. 10,000 simulations were run for
121 uniformly spaced values of R0 across the range [0.5–1.1] with dispersion parameter ! fixed to
0.1 following expectations from previous studies of coronavirus behavior (Lloyd-Smith et al., 2005).
Each simulation results in a vector of outbreak sizes c, where ci is the size of the ith transmission clus-
ter and
PK
i¼1 ci ¼ 2000 and K is the number of clusters generated.
Following the underlying transmission process generating case clusters c, we simulate a second-
ary process of sampling some fraction of cases and sequencing them to generate data analogous to
what we empirically observe. We sample from the case cluster size vector c without replacement
according to a multivariate hypergeometric distribution (see Algorithm 1: Multivariate hypergeomet-
ric sampling scheme). The resulting sequence cluster size vector s contains K entries, some of which
are zero (i.e. case clusters not sequenced), but
PK
i¼1 si ¼ 174 which reflects the number of human
MERS-CoV sequences used in this study. Note that this ‘sequencing capacity’ parameter does not
vary over time, even though MERS-CoV sequencing efforts have varied in intensity, starting out slow
due to lack of awareness, methods and materials and increasing in response to hospital outbreaks
later. As the default sampling scheme operates under equiprobable sequencing, we also simulated
biased sequencing by using concentrated hypergeometric distributions where the probability mass
function is squared (bias = 2) or cubed (bias = 3) and then normalized. Here, bias enriches the
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hypergeometric distribution so that sequences are sampled with weights proportional to
ðcbias
1
; cbias
2
; . . . ; cbiask Þ. Thus, bias makes larger clusters more likely to be ‘sequenced’.
After simulations were completed, we identified simulations in which the recovered distribution
of sequence cluster sizes s fell within the 95% highest posterior density intervals for four summary
statistics of empirical MERS-CoV sequence cluster sizes recovered via structured coalescent analysis:
number of sequence clusters, mean, standard deviation and skewness (third central moment). These
values were 48–61 for number of sequence clusters, 2.87–3.65 for mean sequence cluster size, 4.84–
6.02 for standard deviation of sequence cluster sizes, and 415.40–621.06 for skewness of sequence
cluster sizes.
We performed a smaller set of simulations with 2500 replicates and twice the number of cases,
that is,
PK
i¼1 Ci ¼ 4000, to explore a dramatically underreported epidemic. Additionally, we per-
formed additional smaller set of simulations on a rougher grid of R0 values (23 values, 0.50–1.05),
with 5 values of dispersion parameter ! (0.002, 0.04, 0.1, 0.5, 1.0) and 3 levels of bias (1,2,3) to jus-
tify our choice of dispersion parameter ! that was fixed to 0.1 in the main analyses (Figure 3—figure
supplement 6).
Algorithm 1: Multivariate hypergeometric sampling scheme
Pseudocode describes the multivariate hypergeometric sampling scheme that simulates sequencing.
Probability of sequencing a given number of cases from a case cluster depends on cluster size and
sequences left (i.e. ‘sequencing capacity’). The bias parameter determines how probability mass
function of the hypergeometric distribution is concentrated.
Data: Array of case cluster sizes in outbreak c ¼ ðc1; c2; . . . ; cKÞ, sequences available M, total out-
break size N, where N ¼
PK
i¼1 ci.
Result: Array of sequence cluster sizes sampled: s ¼ ðs1; s2; . . . ; sKÞ.
Draw si from a hypergeometric distribution with ci successes, N   ci failures after M trials;
while i<K do
i ¼ iþ 1;
M ¼ M   si 1;
Compute the probability mass function (pmf) for all possible values of si,
p ¼ ðpð0Þbias; pð1Þbias; . . . ; pðciÞ
biasÞ  ð
P
i p
bias
i Þ
 1, where pðÞ is the pmf for a hypergeometric distri-
bution with ci successes, N   ci failures after M trials;
Draw a sequence cluster size si from array of potential sequence cluster sizes ð0; 1; . . . ; ciÞ accord-
ing to p;
end
Add remaining sequences to last sequence cluster cK ¼ M   sK 1;
Demographic inference of MERS-CoV in the reservoir
In order to infer the demographic history of MERS-CoV in camels we used the results of structured
coalescent analyses to identify introductions of the virus into humans. The oldest sequence from
each cluster introduced into humans was kept for further analysis. This procedure removes lineages
coalescing rapidly in humans, which would otherwise introduce a strong signal of low effective popu-
lation size. These subsampled MERS-CoV sequences from humans were combined with existing
sequence data from camels to give us a dataset with minimal demographic signal coming from epi-
demiological processes in humans. Sequences belonging to the outgroup clade where most of
MERS-CoV sequences from Egypt fall were removed out of concern that MERS epidemics in Saudi
Arabia and Egypt are distinct epidemics with relatively poor sampling in the latter. Were more
sequences of MERS-CoV available from other parts of Africa we speculate they would fall outside of
the diversity that has been sampled in Saudi Arabia and cluster with early MERS-CoV sequences
from Jordan and sequences from Egyptian camels. However, currently there are no indications of
what MERS-CoV diversity looks like in camels east of Saudi Arabia. A flexible skygrid tree prior
(Gill et al., 2013) was used to recover estimates of scaled effective population size (Net) at 50 evenly
spaced grid points across six years, ending at the most recent tip in the tree (2015 August) in BEAST
v1.8.4 (Drummond et al., 2012), under a relaxed molecular clock with rates drawn from a lognormal
distribution (Drummond et al., 2006) and codon position partitioned (positions 1þ 2 and 3) HKY
þG4 (Hasegawa et al., 1985; Yang, 1994) nucleotide substitution models. At time of writing
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advanced flexible coalescent tree priors from the skyline family, such as skygrid (Gill et al., 2013)
are available in BEAST v1 (Drummond et al., 2012) but not in BEAST v2 (Bouckaert et al., 2014).
We set up five independent MCMC chains to run for 500 million states, sampling every 50 000 states.
This analysis suffered from poor convergence, where two chains converged onto one stationary dis-
tribution, two to another and the last chain onto a third stationary distribution, with high effective
sample sizes. Demographic trajectories recovered by the two main stationary distributions are very
similar and differences between the two appear to be caused by convergence onto subtly different
tree topologies. This non-convergence effect may have been masked previously by the use of all
available MERS-CoV sequences from humans which may have lead MCMC towards one of the multi-
ple stationary distributions.
To ensure that recombination was not interfering with the skygrid reconstruction, we also split
our MERS-CoV alignment into ten parts 2937 nucleotides long. These were then used as separate
partitions with independent trees and clock rates in BEAST v1.8.4 (Drummond et al., 2012). Nucleo-
tide substitution and relaxed clock models were set up identically to the whole genome skygrid anal-
ysis described above (Drummond et al., 2006; Hasegawa et al., 1985; Yang, 1994). Skygrid
coalescent tree prior (Gill et al., 2013) was used jointly across all ten partitions for demographic
inference. Five MCMC chains were set up, each running for 200 million states, sampling every 20,000
states.
Data availability
Sequence data and all analytical code is publicly available at https://github.com/blab/mers-structure
(Dudas, 2017). A copy is archived at https://github.com/elifesciences-publications/mers-structure.
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